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Continental	Breakfast	12:	Where	is	Brexit	heading	to?
The	UK	wants	to	remain	economically	in	the	UK,	but	leave	it	politically.	Horatio
Mortimer	(LSE)	reports	on	a	breakfast	event	held	at	the	LSE	to	discuss	where
Brexit	is	likely	to	end	up.	The	likely	outcome,	the	participants	concluded,	will	be	a
‘Brino’	–	Brexit	in	name	only	–	that	satisfies	no	one.
In	simplified	terms,	at	the	moment	there	is	no	border	between	the	UK	and	the
EU.	Brexit	means	re-inserting	a	border.	The	question	is	how	thick	the	border
should	be.	A	border	is	a	barrier	at	which	standards	are	checked.	These	days	it
has	very	little	to	do	with	tariffs.	As	part	of	the	EU,	the	UK	is	trusted	to	produce
goods	and	services	to	EU	standards,	so	there	is	no	need	for	a	border.	In	leaving
the	EU,	the	UK	is	deciding	that	those	standards	will	no	longer	be	applied,	so	that
trust	cannot	continue.	An	economic	space	is	one	that	shares	the	same	regulatory
standards.	The	more	different	those	standards	are	between	two	economic
spaces,	the	thicker	the	border.	You	cannot	have	two	different	regulatory
standards	and	no	border	between	them,	because	in	such	a	case,	only	the	less	costly	standard	(usually	the	weaker
one)	will	continue	to	apply.	This	is	because	competitive	pressures	will	force	industry	to	locate	itself	wherever	costs
are	lowest,	which,	other	things	being	equal,	will	be	where	regulatory	compliance	is	less	costly.	A	thicker	border
means	a	larger	degree	of	regulatory	dis-alignment	between	the	UK	and	EU.	The	thicker	the	border,	the	greater	the
economic	cost	of	trading	across	it.
The	negotiation	now	underway	is	not	between	the	EU	and	the	UK,	but	within	the	UK.	The	EU	has	made	clear	what
options	are	available,	and	the	UK	is	now	in	the	process	of	deciding	which	one	to	select.	In	Theresa	May’s	Lancaster
House	speech,	the	UK	asked	for	a	settlement	by	which	it	would	not	only	no	longer	commit	to	apply	the	standards	of
the	Single	Market,	but	also	it	would	no	longer	allow	the	EU	to	monitor	the	standards	of	goods	and	services	entering
the	Single	Market,	and	of	course	the	EU	could	not	accept	it.	In	the	‘Chequers’	proposal,	the	UK	softened	its	position
and	agreed	to	allow	‘a	common	rulebook’	for	all	goods,	but	not	for	services.	The	common	expectation	is	that	the	UK
will	have	to	make	some	further	concessions,	but	that	an	agreement	will	be	reached	before	the	end	of	the	year,
probably	postponing	some	of	the	most	intransigent	issues.
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The	UK	now	has	a	choice	between	a	thin	border,	which	necessitates	some	EU	jurisdiction	over	standards	in	the	UK,
and	a	thick	border	which	will	have	a	consequent	economic	cost	and	reduce	trade	between	the	EU	and	UK.	As	soon
as	the	UK	leaves	the	EU	there	will	be	a	border,	but	the	thickness	of	the	border	will	vary	over	time	depending	on	the
level	of	regulatory	alignment,	and	the	trust	that	can	be	built	between	the	EU	and	UK	regarding	the	standards	of
goods	and	services	crossing	the	border.	These	are	obviously	affected	by	any	trade	agreements	the	UK	will	sign	with
other	countries.	If	the	UK	opens	its	borders	to	countries	with	lower	standards,	or	tries	to	compete	by	undercutting
regulation,	then	there	will	be	no	trust	and	thick	borders.
There	will	be	a	deal	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	government,	because	it	is	easy	enough	to	conclude	something	that
kicks	the	can	down	the	road.	The	only	question	is	whether	the	British	parliament	will	accept	it.	The	chances	of	a	‘no
deal’	are	low,	because	the	parliament	has	two	alternatives,	either	of	accepting	the	deal,	or	of	organising	a	second
referendum.	Another	referendum	would	require	extending	Article	50,	which	is	complicated	by	the	European
parliament	elections	at	the	end	of	May,	but	there	may	be	some	solution	such	as	allowing	the	UK	MEPs	to	remain	in
their	seats	without	re-election.
The	upcoming	decision	in	the	UK	parliament	is	likely	to	centre	on	the	length	of	the	so-called	transition,	which	is	not
really	a	transition	but	a	standstill	to	allow	time	for	further	negotiations.	The	issue	will	be	how	far	down	the	road	the
can	is	kicked.	Labour	has	already	declared	that	it	will	oppose	whatever	deal	the	government	proposes.	There	are
certain	to	be	a	number	of	Conservative	MPs	who	vote	against	the	agreement,	either	from	the	pro	or	anti	–Brexit
wings	depending	on	the	nature	of	the	agreement.	Whether	the	government	succeeds	in	passing	the	legislation	may
therefore	depend	on	the	number	of	pro-EU	Labour	MPs	who	are	so	frightened	of	a	‘no	deal’	scenario	that	they	will
rebel	and	vote	for	the	agreement.
Very	probably,	the	fundamental	decisions	that	the	UK	faces	on	the	nature	of	its	relationship	with	the	EU	will	be
postponed	for	many	years.	During	that	period	the	UK’s	leverage	in	negotiations	will	fall	still	further.	Inside	the	EU	the
UK	had	significant	influence	as	demonstrated	by	Margaret	Thatcher’s	negotiation	of	the	budget	rebate,	and	by	all	the
different	opt-outs	the	UK	has	managed	to	obtain.	Outside	all	of	the	decision	making	bodies,	the	UK	will	have	little	to
offer	in	return	for	support	from	member	states.
Although	the	chances	of	‘no	deal’	are	small,	the	consequences	would	be	huge,	so	the	rational	thing	is	to	prepare	for
it.	Unfortunately,	this	itself	has	a	cost,	and	not	only	for	business	where	investment	and	therefore	growth	have	been
affected	by	the	uncertainty.	All	kinds	of	issues	where	UK–EU	cooperation	are	not	at	all	contentious	are	thrown	into
doubt.	Research	collaborations,	projects	for	cyber-security	and	joint	crime-fighting	initiatives	have	not	gone	forward.
The	UK	has	already	committed	£92m	towards	an	alternative	satellite	system	after	an	unnecessary	legalistic	dispute
with	the	EU	as	to	whether	as	a	non-member	the	UK	would	have	access	to	the	Galileo	encryption	keys.	All	of	these
have	a	cost.	It	is	highly	unlikely	that	the	UK	will	not	remain	within	the	European	scientific	research	space,	but	that
small	risk	is	enough	to	disrupt	collaborative	projects,	and	the	longer	the	delay	in	putting	an	end	to	this	uncertainty,
the	more	costly	it	becomes.	(Since	this	Breakfast	took	place,	29	Nobel	scientists	have	written	to	the	President	of	the
European	Commission	and	Theresa	May	to	plead	for	a	deal.)
Similarly,	science	and	academic	research	is	heavily	reliant	on	an	immigration	policy	that	allows	brains	to	circulate.
The	recent	announcements	by	the	government	following	the	report	from	Migration	Advisory	Committee	seems	to	be
turning	that	policy	on	its	head	in	a	way	that	could	have	very	serious	consequences	for	academic	research	and	higher
education	more	generally.
As	a	‘third	country’,	with	a	bilateral	agreement	with	the	EU	to	remain	within	the	EU	research	framework,	the	UK	will
have	to	pay	more	than	it	does	now.	This	is	because	the	money	for	the	programme	comes	from	the	EU	budget,	while
the	funds	are	distributed	on	the	basis	of	research	excellence,	and	the	UK	has	many	centres	of	excellence.	In	a
bilateral	agreement	both	sides	will	expect	to	benefit	financially	in	proportion	to	what	they	contribute.	The	fact	that	the
UK	will	have	to	pay	more	may	itself	be	the	reason	it	has	not	already	been	agreed,	since	it	is	politically	awkward	for
the	government	implementing	Brexit.
What	is	the	future	of	the	EU?
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The	Delors	vision	for	European	monetary	union	with	the	political	institutions	to	sustain	it	has	not	been	tried	and
failed,	but	rather	has	not	been	fully	tried.	At	Maastricht	there	was	a	collective	failure	of	nerve	and	will	in	the
establishment	of	the	terms	of	the	single	currency,	which	haunts	the	EU	to	this	day.	It	may	be	that	enlargement	made
the	problems	of	the	single	currency	inevitable,	but	the	question	is	whether	and	how	they	will	be	addressed.	Will	the
EU	move	towards	the	Macron	vision,	or	will	it	continue	its	tradition	of	muddling	through	crises?	There	seems	little
doubt	that	people	in	Europe	want	to	protect	the	European	model.	They	don’t	want	to	be	left	with	a	choice	between	a
Chinese	state	managed	capitalism	or	the	American	hyper-individualistic	model.	But	in	order	to	defend	the	European
model,	the	EU	may	need	to	transform	itself	into	a	more	coherent	entity	capable	of	pursuing	long	term	strategic	goals.
Outside	the	EU,	what	is	the	UK’s	interest	in	the	EU’s	future?
The	global	rules-based	trading	system	has	been	largely	built	and	maintained	by	the	United	States.	However	it	is	far
from	clear	that	the	US	can	be	relied	on	to	continue	to	play	this	role.	In	trade	terms,	the	other	major	powers	are	China
and	the	EU.	Those	who	campaigned	for	the	UK	to	leave	the	EU	are	if	anything	even	more	committed	to	rules-based
international	trade,	and	the	question	is	what	can	and	should	the	UK	do	outside	the	EU	to	maintain	it.	With	the	US
taking	an	increasingly	confrontational	approach	to	China,	it	seems	likely	that	the	EU	will	be	absolutely	critical	to	the
maintenance	of	a	rules	based	system,	and	the	UK	will	continue	to	have	a	very	strong	interest	in	the	successful
integration	of	the	EU.
Furthermore,	Britain	is	a	European	country,	and	it	cannot	leave	Europe.	Not	only	is	it	heavily	integrated	economically,
but	it	is	also	a	European	society	with	a	tradition	of	a	characteristically	European	balance	of	individual	freedom	and
social	welfare.	In	the	end,	whatever	the	actual	format	of	the	UK-EU	agreement	–	whether	it	is	a	Canada	style	trade
agreement,	or	a	Customs	Union	–	in	practical	terms,	a	‘Brexit	In	Name	Only’	is	inevitable.	Switzerland	is	an	example
of	a	country	that	pretends	to	itself	it	is	not	in	the	European	Union,	but	in	effect	almost	every	sector	of	its	economy	is
subject	to	European	regulation.	In	fact,	in	the	global	economy,	because	it	is	cheaper	to	produce	international
products	to	a	single	standard,	firms	often	choose	to	comply	with	the	strictest	regulations,	which	tend	to	be	those	of
the	EU.	So	even	some	American	firms	are	in	this	way	subject	to	European	regulations.	For	example,	the	tech	giants
are	implementing	European	data	protection	rules,	which	were	also	included	in	the	EU-Japan	trade	agreement.
Another	reason	that	it	will	be	clearly	in	the	UK’s	interest	to	remain	closely	integrated	with	the	EU	is	the	inferior	quality
of	alternative	possible	trade	agreements.	Bilateral	and	regional	trade	agreements	have	varying	degrees	of	friction
within	them,	with	the	EU	at	the	extreme.	The	Trans	Pacific	Partnership,	for	example,	includes	a	very	diverse	set	of
countries	that	makes	it	impossible	for	it	to	have	anything	close	to	the	frictionless	trade	that	happens	between	EU
members.	TPP	is	unlikely	to	be	more	than	a	small	improvement	on	the	basic	WTO	trade	agreement.
What	has	the	EU	learned	from	Brexit?
Many	continental	Europeans	see	the	causes	of	Brexit	in	the	UK’s	failure	to	maintain	an	adequate	social	safety	net	to
shield	the	less	fortunate	from	the	disruptions	caused	by	globalisation.	They	see	the	same	issues	at	the	root	of	the
election	of	Trump.	Support	on	the	continent	for	the	EU	has	gone	up	by	10%	since	Brexit,	although	Trump	and	Putin
are	perhaps	also	important	factors.
There	has	been	a	big	transformation	among	continental	European	populists.	The	previous	generations	were
nationalists.	The	new	generation	are	pan-European,	like	Orban,	who	do	not	question	the	necessity	of	the	EU,	but
they	want	to	integrate	Europe	in	their	own	way.	In	Italy	for	example,	the	complaint	about	immigration	is	that	other
European	states	are	not	sharing	the	burden.	In	France,	the	far-right	have	abandoned	their	campaign	to	leave	the
euro.	UK	populists	may	be	different	in	this	respect,	perhaps	resulting	from	the	strength	of	Britain’s	ex-imperial
networks.
The	world	has	changed.	Trade	negotiations	are	no	longer	about	tariffs,	and	they	are	less	and	less	about	removing
protections	for	producers	against	foreign	competition.	Instead	they	are	about	removing	the	differences	in	protections
for	consumers.	This	has	a	very	different	dynamic,	because	it	is	not	about	removing	the	protections,	but	rather	about
levelling	them	up.	Countries	with	the	best	consumer	protections	are	at	the	forefront	of	driving	these	new	agreements.
An	example	is	the	Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership	in	which	car	bumper	regulations	would	be
harmonised	and	create	economies	of	scale	for	car	manufacturers.
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Brexit	is	an	attempt	at	de-globalisation,	dis-integrating	from	the	UK’s	main	trading	partners,	whilst	pretending	that	it
can	be	done	without	economic	consequences.	The	inevitable	outcome	is	that	the	UK	will	remain	economically
integrated	with	the	EU,	and	subject	to	virtually	all	of	its	rules,	either	explicitly,	or	implicitly	–	such	that	it	will	have	to
plagiarise	them	word	for	word	while	pretending	that	it	wrote	them	itself.	Even	so,	there	will	be	a	new	border	between
the	EU	and	UK	for	which	both	sides	will	pay	some	economic	cost,	and	in	Ireland	perhaps	even	in	blood.	The	UK	will
lose	all	leverage	within	the	EU,	and	consequently	also	greatly	reduce	its	influence	beyond	the	EU.	In	exchange	it	will
get	nothing	more	than	a	phony	certificate	of	national	sovereignty.	Almost	nobody	who	campaigned	for	Brexit	will	feel
it	has	been	executed,	while	those	who	campaigned	against	it	will	feel	equally	betrayed.	The	whole	country	will	have
been	effectively	disenfranchised,	and	the	political	consequences	are	unpredictable	and	likely	to	be	dramatic.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Horatio	Mortimer	is	a	business	partnerships	manager	at	the	LSE	and	public	affairs	consultant.
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